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   Paid employment determines pension levels, for both women and men. In those 
European countries in which women have been integrated into the labour market 
at an early stage their protection in old age is higher today for that reason alone. 
Germany lags behind in this respect.
   Gender-specific differences in the employment participation of the low educated 
are greater than those between the educated, everywhere. The differences are more 
substantial in Germany than in many other European countries.
   A fair pension policy that can prevent poverty thus begins in the labour market. It 
has to improve employment opportunities for women and men of all social classes.
   The pension systems of countries in which gender relations were modernised early 
correspond to the »Beveridge model«: a universal basic pension, supplemented with 
mandatory occupational pensions, prevents old-age poverty more effectively and 
enables women to be more independent.
   The pension systems of countries in which gender relations were modernised later 
are income- and contribution-dependent. These »Bismarck countries« prevent pov-
erty less effectively and maintain a legacy of dependence.
   Despite retrenchment, women in Beveridge countries are better protected against 
poverty. The statutory pension in Germany, however, has fallen to the lowest level 
among the countries investigated in this paper, affecting the low educated in par-
ticular. The Beveridge countries show that preventing poverty entails a statutory 
minimum pension and mandatory contributory pensions. German social policy 
should learn from this.
STUDY1
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Overview1
It is important for everyone to know that they will receive 
a regular income even when the period of their lives in 
which they are economically active comes to an end. Be-
sides that, most people want this income to match their 
previous living standards. In many European countries the 
goal of their pension systems from the late 1950s was 
to meet these expectations. Initially, pension insurance 
schemes were based on the assumption that women 
and men generally live together as a married couple with 
children and then grow old together. In that case it would 
not be a problem if the income of a retired couple largely 
consisted of one »breadwinner’s pension« that would 
be enough for both partners, sometimes supplemented 
with a modest additional pension on the part of the 
wife, and survivors’ pensions for those who survived their 
husbands. Needless to say, it was never a simple matter 
to achieve the goal of ensuring income in old age, even 
on these premises, and often it was possible only to 
a limited extent. Some countries were more successful 
than others, some social groups were privileged and 
others excluded.
The disadvantages of the breadwinner model became 
clearer over time. The changes in labour markets from 
the 1960s on had more radical consequences for wom-
en’s lives than for those of men; women became more 
economically active and bore fewer children; couples did 
not necessarily remain together for life; divorces were 
more and more frequent. Furthermore, people were 
living longer. Since the 1970s markets have become 
increasingly integrated, both in Europe and globally. This 
change has had far-reaching consequences.
The social movements of the 1970s raised public aware-
ness of the fact that women’s unpaid care for children, 
husbands and household brought them greater social 
risks than originally expected and that, furthermore, their 
employment income often led to inadequate independ-
ent pension entitlements. Social scientists argued that 
the social and economic changes entailed »new social 
risks« (Bonoli 2005) that affected women in particular. 
Welfare states and employers are not adequately set up 
to protect them against this and should at least alter 
the premises of the breadwinner model. The heightened 
1.  This study is dedicated to my parents Christa and Gerhard Meyer.
internationalisation of markets has put welfare states and 
enterprises under further pressure to curb costs.
This overview illustrates the reform pressure under which 
Europe’s pension systems found and continue to find 
themselves. It also shows that this crucially has to do 
with the changes in women’s and men’s everyday lives. 
The present study is dedicated to the relations between 
social change and pension systems. I will outline the 
types of pension system that exist in Europe; how they 
have changed due to reform; and what consequences 
this has for women’s and men’s incomes in old age.
The report will pay particular attention to how Germany 
stands in comparison with other countries and what 
German social policymakers – especially those who want 
to realise social democratic values – can learn from other 
European developments.
In Section 1 I shall explain why this report concentrates 
on the estimated income of future rather than current 
pensioners. This is followed in Section 2 by segments 
on factors influencing future national pension reforms. 
These factors include the various institutional forms of 
statutory and company old age insurance in Europe. In 
many European countries company pensions have be-
come much more important alongside statutory pensions 
since the 1990s and thus have to be included when 
assessing the quality of old age provision. After the 
far-reaching reforms of the Schröder government at the 
beginning of the millennium this applies to Germany in 
particular. In the academic debate Europe’s pension sys-
tems are gathered into two types: on one hand, there is 
the Bismarck model, with Germany as a major represent-
ative. On the other hand, there is the Beveridge model. 
The two groups of countries face different pension-policy 
challenges. Future pension reforms in the countries of 
both groups will be affected by their economic devel-
opment, however, which has consequences for the level 
of employment participation of women and men. We 
need to look at the economy and the labour market 
because the level of income in old age depends crucially 
on individual employment histories, especially in periods 
in which the equivalence principle becomes more impor-
tant with regard to pensions, while the significance of 
the maintenance principle (Versorgungsprinzip) declines. 
Section 3 analyses how the access of men and women 
to the labour market has changed since the 1960s and 
asks what this change means for pension rights and 3
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equality between the sexes. A key argument here is that 
the differences between women and men have to be 
considered in relation to social inequality; that is, based 
on income and educational differences. According to 
Esping-Andersen’s thesis of the »incomplete revolution« 
(2009) pension inequality between women and men is 
a much bigger problem for those with a lower level of 
education.
Sections 4 and 5 review pension reforms in the coun-
tries under examination over the past 15 years in the 
two groups. Here I shall evaluate how the mixture of 
modernisation, which everywhere was sensitive to the 
greater social risks of women, and the sometimes very 
significant cuts in general pension levels will affect the 
future pension entitlements of women and men. Finally, 
after a brief summary of the key results, in section 6 I shall 
ask what policy measures would make sense in order to 
prevent poverty risks and not to endanger the status of 
the middle class. Throughout the study particular empha-
sis is put on the situation in Germany and compared with 
developments elsewhere.
The report comes to the conclusion that in particular 
Germany has created risks for future pensioners with 
its reforms over the past decade, especially for women 
and men with lower levels of education and thus lower 
lifetime earnings. Furthermore, ensuring the social sta-
tus of higher earners over the long term has also been 
called into question. The experiences of the Beveridgean 
countries show that in order to tackle these problems 
it is important to introduce mandatory occupational 
pensions; furthermore, the statutory pension must be 
set at a minimum, poverty preventing level, regardless of 
employment income to replace income support.
1. Why We Should Be Worried about Future 
Pensions: Object of the Investigation
What types of pension system are there in Europe? How 
have they changed due to reforms and what are the con-
sequences for the old-age income of women and men? 
In order to be able to answer these questions empirically 
we need to focus on a number of considerations first.
To begin with, the question arises of whose pensions we 
should be looking at. For example, one could compare 
the incomes of current pensioners. These depend on the 
rules of insurance systems that applied for the 45 years 
or so that an active working life lasts. The analysis should 
therefore begin in 1968 at the latest; however, because 
there are older pensioners alive today we can look back 
at least to 1948. Contemporary pensions are determined, 
second, by pensioners’ employment histories between 
1948 and 2010, as well as by their family status. Further-
more, different conditions apply to married people than 
to single people.
In the literature there are many investigations concerning 
the adequacy of pensions. Research conducted from a 
gender-specific perspective often points to disadvantages 
suffered by women. Thus, for example, it has long been 
known that women’s pensions as a rule are lower than 
those of men because women tend to have had different 
adult lives than men and because pension systems were 
often closely oriented towards full employment histories 
(for example, Kickbusch/Riedmüller 1985; Kulawik 1989; 
Langan/Ostner 1991; Lewis 1992).
Such outcomes are relevant for current social policy 
because they show who among today’s over 65s are in 
need. If such knowledge leads to the conclusion that re-
forms are required, however, they should concentrate on 
today’s pensioners. The task would then be to improve 
existing old-age incomes, for example, by supplementary 
payments or taxes. The way in which the pension enti-
tlements of current workers are acquired in future would 
be irrelevant for this purpose.
Because for decades the German – Bismarckian – pen-
sion system was fairly generous and, furthermore, was 
extended to cover the new federal states poverty hitherto 
has been a relatively minor social problem in Germany 
(for example, Meyer/Bridgen 2011: 171–174; OECD 
2001: 22). The present report will thus not deal with the 
income situation of these pensioners. Instead, in what 
follows I shall consider what we can ascertain today 
about the possible pension levels of future pensioners 
and compare the entitlements of men and women with 
one another. Such a perspective requires that we con-
centrate on current systems and evaluate what kind of 
access adult – that is, currently in employment and/or 
otherwise active – women and men have to them today. 
The best prospects of an adequate income in old age 
are enjoyed by those who are continuously employed. 
Although all countries recognise periods of child rearing, 
care, training and education and other activities as rel-4
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evant to pension rights, also in all countries those with 
longer employment histories receive a higher old-age 
income than those who were economically inactive for 
longer periods during their working lives. For this reason 
we must look not only at current pension systems, but 
also at the options available to both women and men on 
the labour market.
2. The Scope for Reforms
2.1 Why Reformers in Bismarck and in Beveridge 
Countries Have Different Problems
Karl Hinrichs once wrote, with reference to reform 
of German and other European pension systems, of 
»elephants on the move« (Hinrichs 2001). This is because 
old-age insurance systems are institutionally enormous 
and difficult to manoeuvre. In research on institutions 
national old-age pension systems show up as resistant 
to reform because they make long-term commitments 
to citizens on which the latter have to be able to rely. 
Curtailments and changes in relation to such commit-
ments are unpopular and the powers-that-be can be sure 
that they will be punished for it at the next elections; as 
a result, they shy away from them (Pierson 1994). No 
evaluation of the possibility of pension reform can avoid 
the formative influence of existing institutions; they de-
lineate and constrain the paths that reformers can take. 
In Western Europe two dominant forms of pension sys-
tem have developed since the Second World War (Bonoli 
2003; Ebbinghaus 2012). They have had different effects 
on the old-age incomes of men and women and thus on 
social inequality in old age. Furthermore, they have posed 
different problems for reformers and have influenced the 
reform options open to them. I shall present the basic 
forms of both types of system in what follows and in 
Section 5 go into recent reforms.
On one hand, there are the »Bismarck countries«: Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Their 
social security systems were typically characterised by 
state pensions whose level was income- and contribu-
tion-dependent and which replaced a high proportion 
of the final employment income of those who paid into 
pension funds throughout their working lives (OECD 
2001: 22). Furthermore, they offered relatively gener-
ous widows‘ and widowers‘ pensions for the surviving 
partner. Individuals with interrupted employment histo-
ries – for example, due to child rearing – received lower 
pension entitlements. These systems were thus based 
on the abovementioned »breadwinner model«. In most 
countries in this group forms of unremunerated work 
have been recognised as pertinent to pensions since the 
1980s, although as a rule the entitlements obtained in 
this way are lower than those generated by employment. 
Occupational pensions have largely been displaced by the 
status-securing function of statutory systems; at least, 
they were less significant for old-age provision than in 
the group of »Beveridge countries«, to which we now 
turn.
In this group we find the Nordic countries, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In 
their pension regimes provision for old age was organised 
on two levels: on one hand, there was a state pension 
whose level was the same for all. This level was adequate 
to avoid poverty in most countries in this group. These 
pensions were introduced between the late 1940s and 
the 1960s: in 1946 in Switzerland (Bonoli 2007: 219); 
in 1948 in Sweden (Anderson/Immergut 2007: 360); 
in 1957 in the Netherlands (Anderson 2007: 724) and 
Finland (Kangas 2007: 264–266); and in 1964 in Denmark 
(Green-  Pedersen 2007: 464, 83). Furthermore, many 
citizens were entitled to the state pension and it afforded 
those on low incomes higher benefits in comparison with 
their employment remuneration than individuals with 
higher lifetime earnings. These statutory pensions in 
Beveridge countries were thus more redistributive than 
the income-related entitlements that were available in the 
Bismarck countries. However, their level was not deemed 
to be adequate by those who earned more during their 
working lives and expected corresponding living standards 
in old age. For this reason occupational pensions took on 
the role of securing incomes in these countries, which in 
the Bismarckian countries was fulfilled by statutory pen-
sions. In the Beveridgean group occupational pensions 
were often not – or not exclusively – administered by the 
state but an entitlement to membership for the gainfully 
employed was laid down by law. As a consequence, they 
were pervasive.
United Kingdom – An Outsider in the Beveridge Group
Even though the United Kingdom belongs to this group 
due to its developed occupational and low statutory 
pensions, it is ironic that it is the country from which 5
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the group takes its name2 because it is very much the 
outsider in it (Meyer/Bridgen 2011: 159; Schulze/Moran 
2007: 770). First of all, British statutory pensions were 
lower than in the other Beveridge countries. In the Nordic 
countries, Switzerland and the Netherlands statutory 
pensions from at least the 1960s onwards were at or 
above the level of means-tested income support.3 British 
pensioners without occupational pensions, by contrast, 
were dependent on such income support.
Second, only in the United Kingdom was it left entirely to 
companies whether they wanted to offer their employees 
membership of occupational pensions. As a consequence, 
only around half of the gainfully employed population – 
including public-sector employees and, in the private 
sector, the employees of large companies – had access to 
such pensions. Up to the end of the 1990s British occu-
pational pensions consisted largely of so-called »defined 
benefit schemes«. These are income-related payments 
whose level the employer guaranteed to maintain by 
shouldering the financial risk, in place of the employee. 
Furthermore, the level of these occupational pensions 
was among the highest in Europe and thus members 
were privileged (Bridgen/Meyer 2007).
The low statutory pension meant that both men and 
women were dependent on occupational pensions; 
otherwise they had to live in poverty or claim income 
support. However, employer pension schemes were 
more widespread in the public sector than in private 
companies, among which they were concentrated mainly 
in large businesses. For this reason up to the 1990s more 
men than women had access; due to the expansion of 
social services and greater global competition in the 
private sector, however, this was reversed.
The division of pension systems in terms of these two 
groups applies to the period from 1960 to the mid-1990s. 
The ensuing reforms blurred institutional differences be-
tween the groups and thus also changed their effects on 
the pension entitlements of men and women. As already 
mentioned, this will be dealt with in Section 3 of this 
2.  Sir William Beveridge became known beyond the borders of the 
United Kingdom as the author of the »Beveridge Report« (1942). The 
Report was groundbreaking because it propagated a universal insurance 
system covering against all typical poverty risks to which citizens were 
exposed »from the cradle to the grave« (see, for example, Fraser 1984: 
215–217). Pension systems influenced by the spirit of Beveridge are thus 
inclusive rather than selective and are aimed at avoiding old-age poverty.
3.  This poverty line is below the inclusion threshold of 50 per cent of the 
average income, of which more will be said in due course.
report. Before that, however, a number of other factors 
will be examined that are responsible for the differences 
between pension systems.
2.2 The Stronger the Economic Growth, 
the Better the Old-Age Insurance?
The connection between the emergence and expansion 
of welfare states and economic growth has been dis-
cussed intensively in the literature. In the 1970s Harold 
Wilensky was the first to show on a global scale that 
only developed industrialised countries had introduced 
comprehensive social benefits and from this derived the 
insight that the economy determines the growth of the 
welfare state (Wilensky 1975). According to him, the rela-
tionship between the welfare state and economic growth 
arises because with the expansion of markets people rely 
more on money than on the younger generation for their 
security in old age. Pension systems expand as birth rates 
fall. If we compare globally very poor countries with the 
OECD states Wilensky’s thesis is, to date, undoubtedly 
true. It is less convincing, however, within the OECD itself 
or, with regard to the framework of the present report, 
within the European Union.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the gross national prod-
uct (GNP) per capita for 2010 in the 13 countries selected 
for this study. The data reflect real differences in pur-
chasing power. Norway (44,000 euros) and Switzerland 
(38,000 euros) are far ahead of the others, while Spain 
and Italy – with 24,000 to 25,000 euros – are the least 
developed; all the other countries stood at an annual 
27,000 to 32,000 euros per capita.
These economic differences are reflected in overall em-
ployment participation. With the exception of Belgium, 
in 2010 the countries with the highest per capita incomes 
also had the highest overall employment rates. Spain and 
Italy have developed below average in both instances, 
while Germany lies just above the average in terms of 
employment participation and just below it in terms of 
per capita income. The figures suggest that the active 
economic participation of the adult population contrib-
utes to greater economic prosperity. Because gainful 
employment had traditionally been a core activity of men, 
men’s employment rates are more homogenous and 
higher than those of women. A rise in overall participa-
tion is thus attainable primarily by stronger labour market 6
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participation on the part of women. In fact, Figure 1 
also shows that the richest countries examined in this 
study are also among those in which women are most 
economically active. They are also the countries with 
higher part-time rates in relation to overall employment. 
Germany has caught up considerably in this respect 
since the mid-1980s (see below), although in 2010 it still 
lagged behind the Nordic countries, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, all of which had a higher per capita income.
In theory, greater economic wealth could be used to 
fund higher social benefits. However, an automatic 
relationship between economic growth and an ageing 
population, as well as social spending – as expected by 
Harold Wilensky – is not discernible. While employment 
participation and gross national product are correlated 
regardless of the scope of part-time work, the most 
developed countries by no means have the highest pro-
portion of over-64s in the adult population (Figure 2). In 
fact, it appears that economic wealth plays no role in this 
respect in Europe. The relative proportion of older people 
in 2010 was highest in Italy and Germany, but they are 
not the richest countries. Norway, the country with the 
highest GNP per capita even has relatively the lowest 
proportion of people over 64 years of age.
Furthermore, there is no clear evidence that state pension 
expenditure rises with a growing proportion of retirees 
in the population. If we compare, for example, Italy and 
Austria – the two countries in Germany’s group spending 
the highest proportion of GNP on old-age provision – we 
see that the share of the population over 64 years of 
Figure 1: Labour market participation and gross national product per capita, 2010
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations (rounded).
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age is much higher in Italy than in Austria. By contrast, 
Norway and the Netherlands have the same relatively 
low proportion of older people in the population, but 
Norwegian pension expenditure is significantly below 
that of the Dutch. Germany’s pension expenditure is as 
high as that of Finland, although in Germany there are 
markedly more older people. These differences indicate 
that economic and demographic factors are less impor-
tant for the development of state pension expenditure 
than Wilensky assumed. The critics of his modernisation 
theory (for example, Mabbett/Bolderson 1999) agree 
that a high level of economic development is key to the 
institutionalisation of state pension systems, but come to 
the conclusion that the specific contours are determined 
by political decision-making, institutional influence and 
the nature of the private sector.
At the end of this section we can assert that the path 
to higher economic growth also requires a labour mar-
ket policy that makes it easier for women to get a job: 
affordable public child care provision, flexibility in the 
workplace for men and women and parental leave. Such 
policies require higher social expenditure and thus gov-
ernments are likely to shy away from them, at least in the 
short term; however, country comparison shows that such 
investments are productive in the long term and thus that 
Figure 2: Gross national product per capita (’000 euros); pension expenditure as a percentage of 
GNP; 65+ as a percentage of people 15–64 years of age, 2010
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations (rounded).
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their costs can be recovered. In employment-oriented 
pension systems in Europe reforms along these lines thus 
raise the prospect of more equality between men and 
women in old age because they improve the conditions 
for acquiring independent pension entitlements (see 
also, for example, Riedmüller/Schmalreck 2011: 11–16). 
Labour market policy is thus pension policy. It is impor-
tant to emphasise the limits of this policy, however. It has 
no influence on the scope of benefits or the institutional 
form of pensions, which also influence fairness between 
the sexes and social groups. Equitable pension systems 
still depend largely on policy formulation.
3. Modernisation, Social Injustice, 
Discrimination – How Women’s Economic 
Situation Has Changed since 1960
3.1 Employment Participation
In the previous section I underlined the significance of 
employment for economic strength, for which a high 
level of labour market participation among women is 
important, which in turn is improved by giving them 
independent pension entitlements. In what follows we 
shall thus look more closely at how employment has 
changed for women since the 1960s. This change can 
be summarised under the heading of individualisation. 
How great this transformation has been can best be 
perceived in a long-term perspective. Figure 3 shows 
the development of women’s employment participation 
in the selected countries since 1960; both each country 
individually and the average for the Beveridge and the 
Bismarck countries.
In all countries women’s employment has increased sub-
stantially since the 1960s, although significant national 
differences remain, as shown by the standard deviation 
from the average. Interestingly, up to the 1990s this was 
greater in the group of Beveridge countries (Switzer-
land, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom) than in the group of Bismarck countries 
(Germany, Austria, France, Spain, Belgium, Italy). This 
heterogeneity can be explained by the strong increase in 
women’s employment in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and 
Norway between 1960 and 1990, a period in which the 
governments of the Nordic countries adopted far-reach-
ing reforms aimed at gender equality. Women were to be 
integrated into the labour market and child care was to 
be a public good accessible to all (Anderson/Meyer 2006; 
Bonoli 2007). As a result, in five of the seven Beveridge 
countries over half of all women came to be employed 
from 1970. In Finland, Sweden and Denmark the figure 
was already around 60 per cent; participation continued 
to increase strongly, reaching 81 per cent in Sweden and 
66 per cent in the United Kingdom in 1990; only the 
Netherlands lagged behind, with a rapid rise only from 
the mid 1980s. The United Kingdom developed steadily 
and more slowly. In the 1990s growth slowed down 
everywhere, but the Netherlands caught up, so that in 
2011 there was only a low standard deviation (4 percent-
age points) for the Beveridge countries’ average value of 
76 per cent.
In the Bismarck countries this modernisation began 
later and at a lower level. Furthermore, nowhere did it 
occur with comparable scope. In all seven countries in 
the Bismarck group in 1970 less than half of the female 
population was integrated in the labour market; growth 
was slower up to the 1990s; and differences between 
countries remained more constant than in the Beveridge 
countries. Women’s employment participation in 1990 
ranged from 42 per cent in Spain to 60 per cent in France. 
While in 2011 in all Beveridge countries over 70 per cent 
of women had a paid job, in the Bismarck group only 
Germany with 73 per cent achieved the employment 
level of the Beveridge group for the first time in 2010. 
Spain has caught up rapidly since 1990, but Italy remains 
a straggler among the Bismarck countries, where the 
standard deviation was higher (7.4 percentage points) 
than in the Beveridge countries. Even if we exclude Italy, 
in 2011 68 per cent of women were in employment 
in this group of countries; in other words, there was a 
considerable gap with the Beveridge countries.
It is well known that employment participation increases 
with levels of education and training; less well estab-
lished is the realisation that the two country groups differ 
systematically in this respect.
3.2 Differences in Education and Training and Social 
Inequality
Figure 4 shows the average employment participation 
of women with low, medium and high education in the 
two groups of countries since 2000. Germany is shown 
separately. As already mentioned, considerably more 9
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women were in employment in the Beveridge countries 
than in the Bismarck countries. Since 2000, however, 
participation in the Bismarck countries has increased, in 
particular among women with medium qualifications, 
while in the Beveridge group it has stagnated or even 
fallen slightly.
The differences between the educational levels are sub-
stantial. In 2012 78 per cent of highly educated women 
in the Bismarck countries and 82 per cent of women in 
the Beveridge countries were in employment, but among 
medium-educated women the figures were 62 per cent 
and 73 per cent, respectively, and only 38 per cent and 
49 per cent among low qualified women, with Italy way 
behind on as little as 30 per cent.4 Comparison of the 
two country groups shows a considerable lead on the 
part of the Beveridge group, which is narrowest among 
the highly educated, at only 4 percentage points over the 
Bismarck group. The difference between the Beveridge 
and the Bismarck groups with regard to the other edu-
4.  Eurostat, author’s calculations, results not depicted here available on 
request.
Figure 3: Women’s employment participation, 1960–2011
Note: In the legend countries are ordered in accordance with their ranking in 2011.
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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cational levels, at 11 percentage points, is nearly three 
times that. Women in Germany with high and medium 
levels of education are far above the average of the Bis-
marck countries, similar to women with the same levels 
of education in Austria.5 Overall, only in Norway, Sweden 
and the Netherlands are more highly educated women in 
employment. The proportion of women in Germany with 
low education, at 41 per cent, is slightly above the Bis-
marck group average, but far below that of the Beveridge 
group. These are large differences. They are intensified if 
we compare these rates with men’s employment.
Figure 5 shows how men’s employment participation has 
developed during the same period at the various educa-
tional levels. Overall, in accordance with expectations, 
5.  See footnote 2.
more men are in employment than women, at all educa-
tional levels. But while employment participation among 
women has largely increased, among men it has fallen 
at all educational levels, especially among the low edu-
cated (–8 percentage points since 2000 in the Bismarck 
group and –5 percentage points in the Beveridge group). 
Employment participation in the Beveridge countries was 
higher than in the Bismarck countries for all men.
Germany’s profile, in turn, does not fit neatly into this 
categorisation. Men in Germany are considerably above 
the average of both country groups among the highly 
educated, while among the medium and low educated 
they are below the average. Overall, their employment 
participation in 2012, at 91 per cent, was, after Swit-
zerland, the second highest of the countries examined 
in this study.
Figure 4: Women’s employment rates according to level of education – averages of the Bismarck 
and Beveridge countries and of Germany, 2000–2012
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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Before I discuss what different levels of access to educa-
tion and the labour market mean for pension levels in 
more detail in the next section I would like to compare 
the trends for the two genders, which so far we have 
discussed only separately. Figure 6 is helpful in this re-
spect. It shows the gap between the employment rates 
of women and men and how it changed between 2000 
and 2012. The figure demonstrates how much stronger 
men’s integration in the labour market is than that of 
women, but also how much men’s lead has narrowed. 
However, we should also keep in mind that it is only a 
rough indicator because it does not take into account 
either wage levels, which are relevant to inequality, or 
part-time work.
The first important finding is that, over time, the asym-
metries between women and men in the two country 
groups have diminished considerably. This is indicated 
by the fact that the gender difference with regard to 
employment was wider for all countries at the beginning 
of the decade than at the end. This can be explained by 
both the growth in employment participation among 
women and its fall among men. Change was slower 
than the country-group average in Germany and the 
asymmetry among highly educated women and men has 
increased again since 2006.
Second, if we focus on the differences between the 
country groups and select the year 2012 we can con-
clude that gender differences in the Beveridge countries 
were less pronounced. Here men’s lead among the high 
and medium educated is only 5 percentage points, 
compared with 7 and 12 percentage points among high 
and medium educated men, respectively, in the Bismarck 
Figure 5: Men’s employment rates according to level of education – averages of the Bismarck 
and Beveridge countries and of Germany, 2000–2012
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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countries. Low educated men experience the widest 
gap overall, although in the Beveridge group it is with 
12 percentage points lower than in the Bismarck states, 
where it stands at 17 percentage points. In Germany 
the difference between highly educated women and 
men is a little higher than in the other countries of the 
Bismarck group, but considerably lower than the average 
for medium and low educated.
Overall, the largest gender symmetries are between all 
highly educated women and men and between the me-
dium educated in the Beveridge countries; for all other 
countries the difference is at least 7 percentage points, 
but often greater.
Looking, finally, at women’s and men’s incomes the 
picture of symmetry increasing with level of education 
changes; the relationships appear to be more complex. 
Since 2002 Eurostat has surveyed wages and salaries in 
the European Union every four years. Figure 7 is based 
on average monthly wages earned by women and men 
at different levels of education in 2010, comparing wom-
en’s incomes with those of men. Part-time and full-time 
employments are included, which explains part of the 
differences: these data are only rough indicators but they 
do give an impression of how wide the differences are 
between the incomes that men and women at the same 
level of education and same social status can command 
independently. First of all, it is important that in no 
country do women earn anything like as much as men. 
Interestingly, however, in all countries – with the excep-
tion of Spain – the biggest relative wage differences are 
between those with the highest level of formal education. 
The difference is a little more pronounced in the Bismarck 
countries, especially in Austria (women’s wages: 71 per 
cent of men’s wages), France (70.7 per cent) and Italy 
(70.2 per cent), although the difference is also relatively 
large in the Nordic countries. Denmark (73.6 per cent) 
and Germany (73.7 per cent), for example, do not differ 
in this respect. On average, the largest wage symmetries 
are between genders among those with the lowest level 
of formal education. The difference between the high 
and the low educated is particularly marked in Austria 
(17.5 percentage points), France (15.5 percentage points) 
and Germany (14.5 percentage points).
The wage inequality between highly educated women 
and men is described in the literature by the effect of 
the so-called »glass ceiling« (Alàez-Aller et  al. 2011; 
Arulampalam et al. 2006; Christofides et al. 2013). Econ-
omists derive this partly from »productive« – in other 
words, gender-neutral – factors that influence human 
Figure 6: Difference between women’s and men’s employment rates according to educational 
level – average of the Bismarck and Beveridge countries and of Germany, 2000–2012 (percent-
age points)
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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capital: length of job experience, company size, public 
or private sector, working time, type of employment (for 
an overview and criticism, see Tharenou 2013: 200). In 
theory, for example, a woman and a man with little job 
experience and in temporary part-time employment in 
a small private company would earn equally little; in 
practice, however, these conditions characterise rather 
the employment histories of women and lead to men 
with high-level formal educations being more likely to 
achieve the best-paid positions on the labour market than 
correspondingly qualified women. In the labour market 
segments in which a low level of education is expected 
the wage spread is overall narrower, which means smaller 
wage differences between women and men. These neu-
tral factors, however, can explain only around half of the 
wage differences between the genders (Alàez-Aller et al. 
2011: 59–63, 67; Christofides et  al. 2013: 89, 93). On 
top of that come everyday gender-specific discrimination, 
such as the disregard of women in recruitment or in 
labour court proceedings (Blau/Kahn 2000: 8–12), but 
also the persistence of social stereotypes which suggest 
that a gender hierarchy is perfectly normal (Tharenou 
2013: 201–204).
Figure 7: Women’s average gross monthly wages as a percentage of men’s wages according to 
level of education, 2010 (PPS*)
* PPS = purchasing power standard, in other words, wage differences reflect purchasing power differences.
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.
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3.3 »The Incomplete Revolution«
Gøsta Esping-Andersen took education-specific 
asymmetries as the basis for his book The Incomplete 
Revolution (2009). He argues in it that women’s position 
in the employment hierarchy has changed dramatically in 
recent decades, but also that this change has led primar-
ily to more equality between highly educated men and 
women, who are now in a position to concentrate their 
gains in dual-earning couples. In comparison with that, 
inequality among less educated groups has remained 
much higher, which also means that these groups are still 
much more in jeopardy of falling into poverty. He calls on 
politicians to do more to consummate the »incomplete 
revolution« because this promises more prosperity and 
less general inequality for future generations.
This observation – illustrated in detail above – is of con-
siderable significance for the present study because it 
goes without saying that education-specific symmetries 
and asymmetries will affect the pension histories of men 
and women in Europe currently in employment. How-
ever, by concentrating on the gains from modernisation 
due to education in recent decades Esping-Andersen’s 
book overlooks the asymmetries between women and 
men with high-level formal educations and the stubborn 
persistence of discrimination in the developed industrial-
ised countries we have just talked about.
However, the argument concerning the »incomplete 
revolution« is important here because it shows that 
pension policy falls short if it concentrates primarily on 
the particular social risks facing women and ignores the 
effects of social inequality on women and men. Never-
theless, the traditional social-democratic sensitivity to 
class-  specific differences alone is not enough. Inequality 
between people with high levels of education does 
not represent a poverty problem, but persistent wage 
inequality and discrimination are unfair. Despite mod-
ernisation they continue everywhere, even in the social 
democratic countries of Scandinavia, which have been 
committed to gender equality longest and most radically. 
We shall turn to their effects on old-age incomes below.
4. Effects of Social Transformation on Future 
Pensions
4.1 Beveridge Countries
Let us begin with the Beveridge countries. As already 
shown, at the latest since the 1960s basic pensions in the 
Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland have 
been based on citizenship, or similar forms of universal 
social security to which citizens are entitled without a 
general examination of their financial circumstances. 
Such social security reflected the political decision taken 
by these countries that their statutory pension insurance 
should be based on redistribution and thus that even 
those with low lifetime earnings would be able to enjoy 
a minimum standard of living without being depend-
ent on income support. This policy approach enabled 
more women to obtain an old-age income independent 
of men than in the Bismarck countries; these systems 
avoid pronounced social inequality between those with 
employment histories and those without them. How-
ever, these countries were also characterised by rising 
employment participation among women; since as early 
as 1965 more than half of women have been in employ-
ment, exceeding 60 per cent by 1980 and 70 per cent by 
1990 (see Figure 3). The Netherlands was an exception, 
with later but rapid growth. Due to this labour market 
integration women in the Beveridge countries acquired 
not only basic pensions but also access to occupational 
pensions earlier than women in the Bismarck countries. 
A pension entitlement that is independent of one’s hus-
band is already the norm for women now celebrating 
their sixty-fifth birthdays. In the Bismarck countries only 
by 1990 were half of women in employment, an average 
that had risen to only 65 per cent by 2011 (see Figure 3). 
The higher employment participation in the Beveridge 
countries thus represents not only additional protection 
against old-age poverty, but also enables women to enjoy 
retirement incomes similar to those of men and closer to 
their final employment incomes than the universal basic 
pension alone. Pension incomes for many women in the 
Beveridge countries thus prevent poverty and ensure 
social status, thereby achieving more equality between 
the sexes (see, for example, Alláez-Aller et al. 2011: 58). 
Although, as already mentioned, a low level of education 
leads to more pronounced labour-market asymmetries 
between the sexes, in the Beveridge countries even those 
whose social risks are higher due to lower education 
and exposure to a greater confluence of risks are also 15
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secured in old age. They are able to rely not only on a 
basic pension, but also, due to their overall greater and 
earlier employment participation, have good prospects of 
an old-age income sufficient to maintain social status. In 
comparison with the 1960s, therefore, social security for 
women independently of their husbands has increased 
substantially, although with the important caveat that 
nothing like wage equality has been achieved anywhere 
and that gender-specific inequality continues in old age, 
which particularly affects those with high formal educa-
tions. However, this does not apply to the situation in the 
United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom: An Outsider
The British system has been less effective in ameliorating 
pensioners’ class- and gender-specific poverty risks. A 
large proportion of pensioners in the United Kingdom 
were considerably worse off than in Scandinavia, the 
Netherlands or Switzerland, while another segment were 
at least equally well secured. Only those with an employ-
ment history could qualify for a British statutory pension, 
even though this could be interrupted. Furthermore, the 
level of statutory pension depended to a limited degree 
on level of income. For these reasons it was more difficult 
for female British pensioners to acquire a full statutory 
pension than for women in the other countries in the 
Beveridge group, a state of affairs often lamented in the 
literature (for example, Ginn 2003). It was also important 
that no one received a statutory pension higher than 
50 per cent of the average wage, which today is often 
regarded as the threshold for active participation in 
society. What is more, the state pension was well below 
the much lower level of income support; in other words, 
even for men and women with entitlements to a full state 
pension up to 2011 access to an occupational pension 
was essential. But because it was left to employers to 
offer such pensions of their own accord, defined benefit 
schemes, which were exceptional even by European 
comparison (Meyer et  al. 2007), existed only in the 
public sector and in big companies in the private sector 
and thus access to them was dependent on education 
and sector. The relatively early integration of women in 
the labour market for many meant a job in the public 
sector. In particular in welfare state-financed services, 
such as health care, education and social security, qual-
ified women found employment as teachers, doctors, 
social workers or managers, but also as low qualified 
administrative and auxiliary staff. In this area, in addi-
tion, access to occupational pensions and their quality 
improved substantially for part-time employees from the 
1970s. As a result, in the 1990s women’s membership 
of occupational pension schemes continued to increase, 
while the proportion of insured men in the private sector 
decreased. For men and women with higher levels of 
education the inequality of their pension entitlements 
thus diminished; the same applied to female employees 
with intermediate qualifications in the public sector. On 
average, women in this category ending their working 
lives today and entering retirement will not be at risk 
of poverty. Their old-age incomes, despite still existing 
gender-specific wage differences, are also closer to those 
of the men of their generation with equivalent qualifi-
cations than twenty or even ten years ago. If we also 
assume that social risks diminish in relation to couples 
with high-level formal qualifications, but increase for 
couples with a low level of education the result is much 
greater social inequality among British pensioners leaving 
the labour market by the end of the 2010s than among 
their Scandinavian, Dutch or Swiss counterparts. Around 
half of all British employees up to this time were exposed 
to higher poverty risks in old age because, due to low 
education and employment in private companies without 
occupational pensions, especially in the retail trade, pri-
vate services or small and medium-sized enterprises, they 
had no access to additional occupational schemes. Their 
statutory pension entitlements alone will not suffice. 
Thus it can be foreseen that they will be dependent on 
means-tested social benefits.
Two patterns characterised the group of Beveridge 
countries up until around the 1990s. In the Nordic coun-
tries, the Netherlands and Switzerland old-age provision 
offered general protection against poverty and mainte-
nance of social status for men and women who began 
their working lives since the late 1960s: this was due to 
good basic pensions and good access to occupational 
pensions, enhanced by high female employment partic-
ipation. Although the latter was also high in the United 
Kingdom from the 1960s onwards the pension system 
only reinforced social inequality between those who had 
access to the good occupational pensions in the public 
sector and large private companies and the remainder of 
the adult population. Class- and gender-specific social 
inequality in old age was thus high.16
TRAUTE MEYER  |  BEVERIDGE NOT BISMARCK!
4.2 Bismarck Countries
We now turn to the Bismarck countries. As already dis-
cussed, the main characteristic of their pension systems 
is the equivalence principle: benefits are comprehensive 
but related to lifetime earnings; there is no minimum 
protection or only in the form of means-tested social 
benefit. Implementing the principle of redistribution 
in the statutory pension was not politically feasible in 
these countries (see, for example, Baldwin 1990, Korpi/
Esping-Andersen 1984; Hentschel 1983) and thus those 
with longer employment histories based on full-time 
employment found themselves at an advantage. In 
theory, this can affect both women and men, but in 
practice these countries were characterised by gender 
inequality (Figure 6). While in the Beveridge states the 
majority of 65 year-old women can already look back on 
a working career, in the Bismarck countries this will be 
the case only from 2035. Up to the end of the 1980s only 
around half of women qualified for independent pension 
entitlements due to gainful employment (Figure 3); they 
were thus strongly dependent on the incomes of their 
partners. The breadwinner in these countries acquired 
relatively high pension entitlements regardless of their 
educational status and thus the risks of poverty were 
relatively low, but at the cost of women’s personal de-
pendence. Many of those who are 65 years of age today 
have insufficient old-age incomes in their own right, but 
are able to compensate for it via personal dependence 
on a partner. In contrast to the Beveridge model the 
Bismarck system did not compensate for gender-specific 
social inequality arising from the labour market, but even 
intensified it in old age.
However, this assertion applies to the different educa-
tional levels to various degrees. In Section 3 we saw that 
even in the Bismarck countries the differences between 
highly educated women and men is much smaller than 
between those with the lowest level of education. On 
top of that, women and men with lower levels of formal 
education also have weaker ties to the labour market 
and thus to pension entitlements. Due to the equivalence 
principle of statutory pension insurance the risks of pov-
erty are concentrated in this group, while the opposite is 
the case for the best educated.
However, Section 3 also showed that in comparison with 
the Beveridge countries access to the labour market for 
men and women of all educational levels is poorer in 
the Bismarck countries. As a result, a larger proportion 
of women and men in all groups have no access to 
pension entitlements. The difference is particularly sharp 
for those with the lowest level of education. Due to the 
very strong employment orientation of state pensions 
in these countries a larger proportion of the population 
are excluded than in the Beveridge systems, which are 
more strongly oriented to citizen status. Poverty policies 
based on means-testing are thus more important in the 
Bismarck states.
From Germany’s perspective we can conclude that access 
to the statutory pension system is above-average for all 
women and for men with a high level of education in 
comparison with other Bismarck countries and even with 
at least the average in the Beveridge countries. However, 
in 2012 the employment participation and wages of edu-
cated men and women in Germany differed more sharply 
than is usual within the Beveridge framework, with the 
exception of the United Kingdom (Figure 6 and 7). For 
example, the employment participation of German men 
in 2012 was 8 percentage points higher than that of 
women, while the difference in Sweden was only 1 
percentage point.6 At the same time, the employment 
asymmetry of the low educated in Germany means that 
they, especially women, are much more vulnerable, even 
if the wage asymmetry is lower. German pension policy 
must take particular note of this. The question arises of 
whether income-related pension systems are appropriate 
here (see below).
Overall, these developments are in line with Esping-An-
dersen’s picture of the incomplete revolution. In both 
country groups the options available to educated women 
to acquire pension entitlements have come closer 
to those of men, although wage inequality remains 
everywhere, especially among the highly educated, with 
consequences for pension inequality. For the less edu-
cated, however, protection is provided in the Beveridge 
countries by a broad universal pension. In the Bismarck 
states they are confronted with higher poverty risks.
In characterising pension systems in Section 2.1 I con-
centrated on their basic principles, saying nothing about 
the most recent reforms. In what follows I shall present 
these changes and evaluate their significance for the 
gender-specific social risks of future pensioners.
6.  Eurostat, author’s calculations; results not shown here are available on 
request.17
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5. Significance of Pension Reforms since 1995 
for Women and Men
Since the mid-1990s the pension regimes of both the 
Bismarck and the Beveridge countries have changed. In 
summary, almost everywhere the significance of collec-
tive insurance for individual pensions has diminished (for 
example, Ebbinghaus 2011; Meyer et al. 2007). Citizens 
are thus exposed to greater risk.
Welfare states and companies are the two key actors who 
can organise insurance against social risks for citizens and 
employees and who are able to provide protection via re-
distribution in the event of unforeseen occurrences. Only 
states and, to a lesser extent, companies have access to 
additional resources that can be mobilised in cases of 
need. Only states and (to a limited extent) companies are 
also in a position to grant an income in old age even to 
those whose individual contributions were insufficient 
because of lower lifetime earnings. Although individuals 
can insure themselves privately, without the possibility of 
sharing risks with others they are not protected against 
sudden events, such as accidents or economic crises that 
thwart their savings plans or could drastically reduce their 
earnings. For this reason a curtailment of state and com-
pany guarantees brings more insecurity for individuals. 
Such curtailments have taken place in both Bismarckian 
and Beveridgean countries since the 1990s, however, 
with more alarming consequences for the former, as the 
following overview shows.
5.1 Bismarck Countries
In the Bismarck countries governments have substantially 
cut the level of state pensions, while making access to 
statutory systems easier (Table 1; Ebbinghaus 2012; 
Hinrichs/Jessuola 2012:13–14; Meyer et al. 2007). In or-
der to compensate for the cuts at the same time – with the 
exception of Austria and Spain (OECD 2011: 197–198, 
301) – occupational pensions and individual savings 
plans were boosted. Various incentives were intended 
to persuade citizens, companies and trade unions to try 
to expand non-state forms of old-age provision. Thus 
in the countries in which the state pension dominated 
efforts are now being made to distribute responsibility 
for benefits between state, companies and individuals. 
In this way the Bismarck countries have moved institu-
tionally closer to the multi-pillar systems of the Beveridge 
countries. However, there are two key differences that 
are crucial for avoiding poverty: the »newcomers« at 
first decided against introducing basic pensions that are 
independent of employment histories and are not based 
on extensive means-testing. Although access to inde-
pendent pension entitlements has been simplified, from 
which in particular women with interrupted employment 
histories have benefited, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Austria and Spain have no uniform-level basic pensions 
for all, regardless of employment history. Those who do 
not qualify for the statutory pension or have insufficient 
entitlements are dependent on extensively means-tested 
benefits (OECD 2011).
Reduced statutory benefits will thus heighten social risks, 
unless additional private pensions are able to fill the gaps. 
The conditions for that are made more difficult because, 
second, the governments of the Bismarck countries also 
decided against introducing obligatory occupational pen-
sions or other forms of non-state pensions. Employers 
and employees have no obligation, besides their existing 
contributions to statutory pensions,7 to provide for ex-
tensive membership of occupational pensions. Because 
of this voluntary element occupational pension benefits 
for newcomers are not extensive and, in the main, not 
high enough to compensate for substantial cuts in stat-
utory benefits. As we shall see with regard to trends 
in the Beveridge group – and especially in the United 
Kingdom – since the 1990s international companies have 
taken less interest in occupational pensions. Individuals, 
by contrast, often do not undertake sufficient long-term 
planning (Madrian/Shea 2001; Thaler/Sunstein 2009: 
36–39) or their incomes are too low to make up for 
public cuts privately.
Table 1 illustrates these trends. It shows projected pen-
sions in relation to the final income that two hypothetical 
groups of employees would receive if they had begun 
their working lives in 2002 and in 2009 and retired after 
an uninterrupted working career in the 2050s (the length 
of employment histories differ nationally). Individuals in 
the three columns on the left acquire all their entitlements 
based on the provisions that applied in 2002, while in the 
middle three columns we find those who acquired their 
pension entitlements exclusively in accordance with the 
conditions prevailing in 2009. The difference between 
7.  In France there is an income-related pension that is entirely in the 
hands of the state, on top of which there is a statutory portion adminis-
tered by the social partners (Nazcyk/Palier 2011: 94–97).18
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the beginning of 2002 and 2009 can be explained by the 
pension reforms implemented in the meantime. As the 
last three columns show, in almost every instance there 
have been cuts. In other words, the table shows fictitious 
future benefits because pension systems do not remain 
unchanged for decades anywhere. Such simulations, 
here carried out by the OECD, have the important aim of 
determining the viability of national systems at a given 
time. If one compares two particular timepoints with 
one another – in this instance 2002 and 2009 – it can be 
shown whether the reforms implemented in the mean-
time have resulted in improvements or deterioration for 
those affected. The table also examines the effects of 
systems on individuals with different incomes. In this 
instance three types were chosen: an individual with 
an average income, one receiving only half the average 
income and one earning 50 per cent above the average 
income. These categories are differentiated neither in 
terms of individuals’ level of education nor in terms of 
gender; this is not their aim. However, we can make 
good use of the information obtained in this way based 
on our interest in differences between women and men, 
as well as educational differences. Because there is a 
clear relationship between level of education and lifetime 
earnings we can assume that, more or less, the three 
income groups stand for three educational levels. With 
Table 1: Projected net pensions from statutory and other obligatory old age provisions for 
pensioners at the end of their working lives with 50 per cent, 100 per cent and 150 per cent of 
the average wage (percentage of the final wage)
Working life begins in 2002 Working life begins in 2009 Effect of pension reforms in 
2002–2009
Income, percentage 
of the average 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
Bismarck countries
Belgium 82.7 63.8 63.1 74.9 52.1 42.5 −7.8 −11.7 −20.6
Austria 91.2 93.4 93.2 91.3 89.9 84.6 0.1 −3.5 −8.6
Germany 61.7 66.6 71.8 54.8 56.0 55.6 −6.9 −10.6 −16.2
France 98.0 70.8 68.8 69.4 60.4 53.1 −28.6 −10.4 −15.7
Italy 89.3 88.0 88.8 72.0 71.7 71.8 −17.3 −16.3 −17.0
Spain 88.7 89.4 88.3 82.3 84.9 85.4 −6.4 −4.5 −2.9
Average 85.3 67.6 67.9 74.1 59.4 56.4 −11.1 −8.2 −11.6
Beveridge countries
Netherlands 82.5 88.2 84.1 104.5 99.8 96.4 22.0 11.6 12.3
Finland 90.7 78.8 78.8 72.0 65.2 64.4 −18.7 −13.6 −14.4
Sweden 90.2 76.4 68.2 71.1 57.7 75.2 −19.1 −18.7 7.0
Norway 85.8 73.1 65.1 72.9 60.3 49.2 −12.9 −12.8 −15.9
Denmark 95.6 68.0 54.1 131.9 89.8 80.8 36.3 21.8 26.7
Switzerland 71.4 68.9 67.3 78.6 64.1 46.2 7.2 −4.8 −21.1
United Kingdom 78.4 57.7 47.6 62.0 37.4 26.8 −16.4 −20.3 −20.8
Average 84.9 73.0 66.5 84.7 67.8 62.7 −0.2 −5.2 −3.8
Difference 
Beveridge-Bismarck
−0.3 5.4 −1.5 10.6 8.4 6.3 10.9 2.9 7.8
Note: Assumptions: pensions simulated for individuals with full employment histories under the pension systems prevailing in 2002 
and in 2009 with retirement in the 2050s. Pensions below 50 per cent of the average in italics.
Source: OECD 2005: 52; OECD 2011: 12719
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regard to employment histories women and men can 
fall in any category, but given the frequently interrupted 
labour market careers of women and other forms of 
discrimination men are more likely to be concentrated 
in the highest category and women in the lowest, with 
corresponding distribution between the categories. I shall 
discuss different possibilities when interpreting the table.
If we also assume, as is usual in comparative European re-
search, that 50 per cent of the average income represents 
a lower threshold for income that is sufficient to enable 
someone to participate actively in society,8 we can make 
general observations about systems’ viability with regard 
to social inclusion.
It is essential for the issues dealt with in this study that in 
2009 statutory pension entitlements in the six countries 
were much lower than in 2002. If we look at the number 
in terms of an inclusion threshold of 50 per cent of aver-
age income, in 2009 all low earners were further below 
this level than in 2002. This deterioration will affect 
all those with a low education, but especially women. 
Average earners were all well above the threshold in 
2002 and most of them remained so in 2009; only in 
Germany and Belgium do projected pensions come very 
close to this level. Thus even for middle-income women 
and men risks have increased significantly there. The 
highest educated will not be affected by poverty; state 
benefits everywhere are too high to allow that. However, 
the cuts have taken a substantial toll on their pensions 
and thus it is beginning to emerge that their old-age 
income will differ significantly from their previous living 
standards.
The figures suggest that all income groups in the Bis-
marck countries are dependent on voluntary additional 
private insurance. Women and men with low incomes 
need them to rise above the inclusion threshold, but 
saving is difficult for them precisely because of their low 
incomes and thus their risk of poverty is exacerbated. 
Women and men on average incomes or above have to 
save for old age because otherwise their living standards 
will be in jeopardy. This applies particularly to Germany.
8.  This threshold lies significantly above the income support threshold 
of most countries, which lies between 23 and 30 per cent of the average 
wage, but also over the level of minimum universal pensions (OECD 2011, 
author’s calculations, table available on request).
Germany: Outsider in the Bismarck Group
Up to 2000 the German pension system was dominated 
by its statutory branch with income-relatedness as its 
key feature. However, there had been some reforms in 
the 1980s that, above all, improved the independent 
pension entitlements of women: house work and care 
responsibilities received more recognition and part-time 
employment and low wages were upgraded (for exam-
ple, Meyer/Pfau-Effinger 2006). Men were negatively 
affected, especially by the curtailment of early retirement, 
while the raising of the retirement age concerned both 
genders (Meyer/Bridgen 2011).
Despite the dominance of the statutory pension occu-
pational benefits had always played an important role in 
West Germany in maintaining the social status of the core 
personnel of large companies and of public employees. 
Because from 1957 the statutory pension took income 
into account only up to double the average, employees 
with higher earnings had to count on a lower level of 
payments in comparison with their previous income, 
thus making occupational pensions particularly attractive 
to them (Berner 2009: 117–119). In industry, despite 
major economic changes up to the end of the 1990s, at 
least two-thirds of all employees were also members of 
occupational pension schemes; in the public sector the 
proportion was even higher (Meyer/Bridgen 2011). These 
non-state systems were also income-related; in other 
words, companies and public-sector employers bore 
the risk involved in promising a certain level of income 
replacement. However, there were some cuts even in 
occupational pensions before 2000 and the number 
of members fell; however, they continued to play an 
important role in replacing the wages of employees on 
higher incomes.
The reforms imposed by the Social Democratic/Green 
coalition government under Gerhard Schröder between 
2001 and 2004 ushered in a paradigm change in the 
pension system. In the Bismarck group Germany is the 
country that now relies most strongly on non-statutory 
benefits in the avoidance of social risks. Statutory pension 
payments were cut from 70 per cent to 64 per cent of final 
net income for employees with full employment histories, 
while contributions were frozen at below 20 per cent 
of income up to 2020 (Altersvermögensgesetz 2000; 
DRV 2009: 239, 93). There was no statutory minimum 
pension; instead, it was made easier for those whose 20
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statutory pension was too low to claim income support. 
The growth of occupational pensions and individual 
saving schemes was supported by state incentives and 
subsidies; however, there was no statutory obligation for 
companies to offer them. This means that in Germany, 
too, the two measures were lacking that in the Beveridge 
countries have been so effective in preventing poverty: 
a basic pension and obligatory access to occupational 
pensions. Thus the course was set, in the long term, for 
more old-age poverty. This will especially affect people 
with low education and above all low educated women. 
This impression is confirmed by Table 1. Statutory pension 
entitlements for low earners in Germany were, at 54.8 
per cent of the final net wage, by far the lowest among 
these countries, the gap with the next lowest country, 
France, being as much as 14.5 percentage points. This 
considerably exacerbates the risk of poverty of couples 
with low education. Women are harder hit in this respect 
than men because of their weaker links to the labour 
market.
Unfortunately, the prospects are little better for those on 
average income. Only in Belgium is the pension below 
the German level of 56 per cent, while the other coun-
tries in the group are higher by between 4.4 (France) and 
34 percentage points (Austria).
The options open to poorer citizens of making up for 
the risks created in this way by individual savings – for 
example, within the framework of so-called Riester 
pensions – are very limited. Hitherto, there has been no 
country in which a non-statutory savings model of this 
kind has worked (for example, Bridgen/Meyer 2007). The 
futile efforts of British governments to get something of 
the kind off the ground are an obvious illustration (see 
below) and in Germany, too, experience in this area has 
been negative so far (Hagen/Kleinlein 2012).
However, these numbers indicate that also those in 
Germany on average income have been sharply affected 
by the reforms of the past decade. Even if one assumes 
that the statutory incentives to voluntary occupational 
insurance are widely used the new kind of occupational 
pensions, in which the investment risk is largely taken by 
individuals, are not adequate to make up for the cuts to 
statutory benefits. The traditional occupational pensions 
of large companies, which are more reliable for employ-
ees, guaranteeing a fixed level of payment, are under 
similar pressure from the capital markets, for example, 
in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands; some are 
already not taking any new members (for more details, 
see Bridgen/Meyer 2013).
Overall, we can conclude from this overview that without 
further pension reforms substantial parts of the pop-
ulation over 65 years of age will in future live below 
the inclusion threshold of 50 per cent of the average 
income (see also Hinrichs/Jessuola 2012). All those with 
below-average incomes – and thus women in particular – 
would be even harder hit. At the same time, however, 
maintaining the social status of average and above-av-
erage earners, which was stable for a long time, is also 
called into question. Social policy must improve access 
to and the level of occupational pensions or get used 
to the idea of the long-term social decline of the middle 
class in old age, together with the foreseeable political 
discontent of higher earning women and men.
5.2 Beveridge Countries
There have also been cuts in the Beveridge countries in 
the past 15 years, some in basic pensions and some in 
the area of obligatory occupational pensions (Table 1; see 
Ebbinghaus 2012 for country studies). In Norway (OECD 
2011: 279), Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands basic 
pensions and occupational pensions were more strongly 
linked. The level of the first pillar was adapted to that 
of the second: the lower the occupational pension, the 
higher the basic pension. In none of these countries did 
the basic principles of the system change, however: ac-
cess to the minimum level of the first pillar remained for 
all citizens; and they continued to adhere to the statutory 
guarantee of general access to the second pillar for all 
employees, occupational pension schemes.
This is illustrated again by Table 1. It shows, on one hand, 
that the pension entitlements of all income groups have 
been cut. These cuts have been substantial for all income 
groups especially in Finland, Sweden and Norway. As 
already discussed, they reflect the pressure exerted by 
economic globalisation and demographic ageing, but 
also political preferences and the outcome of national 
conflicts. The importance of such politics is illustrated 
by, for example, Denmark and the Netherlands, where 
pension entitlements have risen significantly for all in-
come groups.21
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Despite substantial cuts, in 2009 the average level in the 
Beveridge group for the three income groups was mark-
edly above that of the Bismarck countries. The difference 
of 10.6 percentage points characterising below-average 
incomes was particularly large. This makes evident the 
higher degree of redistribution in the Beveridge group 
even after the cuts. It is important for active inclusion that 
in 2009 future pensions for below-average earners were 
still at least 71.1 per cent (Sweden) and in the Netherlands 
and Denmark were even higher than the wage. In the 
Bismarck group replacement benefits in Austria, Spain 
and Belgium are also relatively high, although not at a 
similar level. If we recall that in the Beveridgean countries 
even women with low formal educations have been well 
integrated in the labour market since the 1970s and have 
a greater probability of following their partners into paid 
employment it is clear that the interplay between eco-
nomic activity and pension systems with basic insurance 
averts the risk of old-age poverty. Women and couples 
with low levels of education and income are thus better 
protected in the Beveridge countries.
In spite of the on average higher protection in the Bever-
idge countries in 2009 the two groups also have a number 
of things in common. For example, in Sweden, Norway 
and Switzerland those on average and/or above-average 
incomes have to accept losses, as their pension incomes 
are substantially below their previous incomes from 
employment. Only Dutch and Danish employees have 
significantly higher entitlements, as do Swedish employ-
ees on higher incomes. As in the Bismarck countries the 
question arises here of how well-paid men and women 
will react to the prospect of such a decline the nearer 
they come to old age.
United Kingdom – Integration of the Outsider
Reforms in the United Kingdom, in turn, took a some-
what different course. As already mentioned, this country 
was long an outsider in the Beveridge group because 
occupational pensions could be offered on a voluntary 
basis and the statutory pension was very low. British 
developments are particularly interesting from a German 
standpoint because for decades the United Kingdom has 
attempted to comply with people’s desire for security in 
retirement on the basis of statutory pensions – which 
on their own were insufficient – by complementing it 
with voluntary private provision, especially occupational 
pensions. Germany’s reformed pension system with its 
mixture of curtailed statutory benefits and orientation to-
wards making up for it with voluntary private provision is 
similar, even though the statutory branch is more strictly 
income-related.
The British example shows the weaknesses of this model 
very clearly. Before the fundamental reforms of the La-
bour government in 2007/2008 the system was plagued 
by the chronic problem that at most only half the popu-
lation was adequately protected. Those without access to 
the excellent occupational pensions in the public sector 
and large companies were heading for dependence on 
income support in old age; they thus had almost no 
incentive to save. On top of that, from the end of the 
1990s many large companies closed their occupational 
pension schemes to new members, motivated by the 
changing circumstances of international markets and 
demographic change, but also by an instinct to follow 
the herd: as soon as certain companies in a sector began 
to close their pension schemes it could be predicted 
that their competitors would follow suit (Bridgen/Meyer 
2005). The problem of inadequate pensions was thus 
exacerbated and now threatened the futures of those on 
average and higher incomes. Various governments had 
tried to make voluntary saving for old age more attractive 
by means of incentives, especially for women and men 
on below average incomes, but they had failed. In order 
to tackle the problem in a different way the reforms of 
the Labour government first raised the statutory pension 
substantially and extended access to it, from which in 
particular women and men on low incomes and with 
interrupted employment histories benefited. Second, all 
employers were obliged from 2013 to pay at least 3 per 
cent of their wages into a pension fund for employees, 
with a state contribution of 1 per cent and a contribu-
tion from the insured person, so that in total a level of 
at least 8 per cent is achieved (Bridgen/Meyer 2011). 
Employees had the right to leave this system. Because 
a return to the problems of the past was no solution 
these reforms were confirmed by the conservative-liberal 
coalition government, although it has had to deal with 
the most serious economic crisis since 1976 (Crossley 
et al. 2012: 5–8). As a result of these reforms the United 
Kingdom, too, now has the characteristics of the other 
countries in the Beveridge group. In Table 1 the effect 
of the 2008/2009 reforms is still not discernible, being 
based on the previous state of affairs. Since the new reg-
ulations came into force, however, the projected pension 22
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level has risen substantially for those previously excluded 
from occupational pensions (Bridgen/Meyer 2011). This 
benefits primarily those on low incomes and incomplete 
employment histories; in other words, the situation has 
improved for women. However, the reform did little for 
the overwhelmingly male employees of large private 
companies on high incomes, who no longer have access 
to the extensive defined-benefit systems: their desire to 
secure their social status can no longer be fulfilled, in the 
long term, by the relatively low level of the new occu-
pational pensions. Qualified women employed primarily 
in the public sector, by contrast, are still well protected 
by the defined-benefit occupational pensions that are 
customary there, although these are now under pressure 
(Bridgen/Meyer 2012).
Overall, gender inequality in relation to old-age provi-
sions has diminished in the United Kingdom. The main 
beneficiaries are those who previously were excluded 
from benefits above the poverty line, including in particu-
lar low qualified women, but also men. The largest at-risk 
group has thus been helped by traditional social demo-
cratic intervention. Losing out, despite the introduction 
of a more extensive minimum threshold, are especially 
average or above-average earning men in the private 
sector. The status insecurity of highly and intermediately 
educated couples has thus increased, as in all other coun-
tries. It is thus apparent that in the United Kingdom over 
the long term the political pressure from the middle class 
will grow (Bridgen/Meyer 2011).
From the German standpoint it is also important to note 
that, after the British pension reforms of 2007/2008, 
there is no longer a country in the Beveridge group that 
leaves occupational pensions to companies. This model 
is deemed as dysfunctional in all these countries with 
developed multi-pillar systems.
6. Beveridge Not Bismarck!
Recommendations for Social Democratic Pension Policy in 
Germany
The aim of the present study is to present Europe’s 
pension systems in transition and to examine the effects 
of the reforms on the situation of women and men. I 
have paid particular attention to the question of what 
social democratic social policy in Germany can learn from 
these developments.
First, it was established that the analysis would focus 
on possible future old-age incomes of today’s employ-
ees. Germany’s pensioners are, on average, not poor 
at present and thus it seemed to make more sense to 
concentrate on the possible problems of future genera-
tions of retirees.
In Section 2, a number of factors that are important 
in relation to the course and effects of the reforms 
were discussed: the pension-insurance institutions of 
different countries determine the quality of old-age 
income. The Beveridge model consists of basic pensions, 
supplemented by statutory occupational pensions. Thus 
people on low incomes are better protected than in the 
Bismarck model, in which there are no basic pensions and 
payments depend more closely on employment earnings. 
This was Germany’s institutional point of departure in the 
1990s, before the major reforms of 2001.
Second, this part of the study showed that economic 
growth and employment participation are correlated and 
that high female employment participation is thus not 
an obstacle to growth – on the contrary. Furthermore, 
it makes it easier for women to acquire independent 
pension entitlements. Policies that facilitate gainful 
employment for women are thus a key component of 
pension policies that protect against poverty.
Sections 3 and 4 of this study showed that women’s 
employment participation has improved substantially 
since the 1960s throughout Europe, but that this trend 
must be differentiated in terms of education and pension 
regimes: the highest educated men and women are also 
those best integrated in the labour market; that is, the 
difference between them is smaller than between men 
and women with the lowest level of education. Second, 
women’s employment integration in the Beveridge coun-
tries occurred much earlier due to their active policies on 23
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equality and all educational groups are integrated – albeit 
to different degrees – at a higher level than in the Bis-
marck countries. This was also an effective pension policy 
because it ensured that a large proportion of women in 
these countries already have independent entitlements 
to pensions that ensure social status beyond the basic 
provisions. Despite this improvement, however, wage 
inequality has not been achieved anywhere and social 
inequality in old age will thus continue.
To date the Bismarck countries have not been at the 
same level as the Beveridge countries. In Germany highly 
educated women have converged with men on the la-
bour market, albeit with the important caveat that wage 
inequality stubbornly persists. The employment partic-
ipation of low educated women and men in Germany 
is overall low – as in other Bismarck countries – but it is 
particularly underdeveloped among women in Germany, 
so that the asymmetry between the sexes in this group 
is high. Furthermore, German women, like other women 
in the Bismarck group, remain more closely dependent 
on men in old age for longer. A pension policy that is 
sensitive to women’s poverty risks must take account of 
this »incomplete revolution« (Esping-Andersen 2009), 
as well as the particular risks of low educated men. This 
very much applies to Germany. With regard to highly 
educated women pension policies should endeavour to 
eliminate unfairness on the labour market.
Since the mid-1990s future pensions have been cut in 
almost every country. This also concerns the Beveridge 
countries, whose social risks have increased, although 
women and men with low levels of formal education 
are better protected by the minimum pension level, the 
obligatory occupational pensions and, not least, by high 
employment participation. In the Bismarck countries, 
however, the cuts have been accompanied by a struc-
tural change that has been most radical in Germany. The 
statutory pension level was markedly lowered here, with 
an increase in the incentives for voluntary occupational 
pensions and personal pension savings plans by way of 
compensation. Thus the social risks of what were already 
the most vulnerable groups – women and men with 
low education and low lifetime earnings – have been 
exacerbated. Because they have the lowest probability 
of obtaining sufficient additional benefits and because 
women in this group are less often in employment, they 
bear the greatest risk of dependence on income support 
in old age.
On top of all this, those earning average or above-aver-
age wages can now no longer rely on maintaining their 
social status in old age. The statutory pension in Germany 
just about gives them an income at the inclusion level, 
but it is more than doubtful whether payments from the 
newer occupational pensions will suffice to compensate. 
Germany’s pension system, since the 2001 reforms of the 
SPD/Green coalition government, is similar to the failed 
UK model.
Middle-class dissatisfaction with low pensions led to the 
extension of income-related benefits in every country in 
Europe during the expansionary phase of the welfare 
state in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, we are seeing a 
reduction of these benefits in almost every country, 
including in the Beveridge group. The nearer those 
affected – average and above-average earning women 
and men – come to retirement, the more urgent will the 
problem become for them. The danger of falling below 
the threshold of social inclusion is greater even for higher 
earning women due to wage discrimination. Future gov-
ernments will encounter problems for this reason. The 
inadequate protection of the middle classes in retirement 
will generate considerable pressure for reform.
What can be done? In particular, what can be done in 
terms of social democratic social policy; that is, a policy 
that seeks to prevent old-age poverty and to create good 
conditions for the active participation of all people in 
society, but which is also sensitive to the interests of 
the middle classes, including especially fairer wages for 
educated women?
Based on the facts and trends discussed, there are two 
worthwhile aims in particular:
First, active labour market policy must continue to try 
to reduce wage inequalities and to promote women’s 
employment, but also that of men, especially those 
with a low level of education. Social science research 
is agreed that policy measures enabling better reconcil-
iation of child raising and working life have a positive 
effect on women’s labour market integration (for ex-
ample, Christofides et al. 2013: 100) and thus can also 
halt the fall in birth rates, especially in Germany and 
Italy (Castles 2003). This insight currently enjoys strong 
political support. The »activation« or »investive social 
policy« paradigm has become strongly anchored in 
European labour-market and social policy (for example, 24
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van Kersbergen/Hemerijck 2012). Its implementation has 
been due less to academic recommendations than to 
the fact that, as shown in Section 2 of this study, a high 
general level of employment participation is correlated 
with economic growth, which in turn was deemed a 
condition of EU member states’ being able to align 
their budgets with the Maastricht criteria, which were 
supposed to ensure a stable European currency. Because 
pension expenditure is the largest single budgetary item 
in all European countries European and national pension 
policymakers have declared that a general increase in 
employment participation is also a key condition of the 
long-term financial stability of pension systems and thus 
of state budgets. They are thus ideologically attached to 
employment-friendly family policies (European Commis-
sion 2012: 6–7).
In this context, Germany has finally undergone an 
ideological turn. Having long been categorised in the 
comparative literature as the best example of the con-
servative welfare state (for example, Lewis 1992) it has 
made considerable progress in the area of public child 
care. The relevant measures have eroded the core as-
sumption of the breadwinner model, which is still widely 
prevalent, that the welfare state should generously 
compensate the loss of income of mothers who look 
after their children at home. The reforms of the 2010s 
have made it easier for all to reconcile family and working 
life, not least by expanding child care for 1 to 3 year-olds 
(Jüttner et al. 2011). They have thus taken an important 
next step towards finishing the incomplete revolution. 
Further reforms should follow, such as the abolition of 
splitting income tax between spouses and the recently 
introduced child care benefit.
Also necessary for fairer participation in the labour mar-
ket for women is the reduction of the wage differences 
between women and men with high formal qualifications, 
which in Germany is particularly pronounced (Alàez-Aller 
et  al. 20011: 64). A family-friendly labour market and 
social policy is an important step in this direction (for 
example, Christofides et  al. 2013), but it must also be 
considered how the stubbornly persistent discrimination 
against women, which is based on disregard and stere-
otyping, can be combated more effectively. A modern 
social democracy that will also be attractive to educated 
women must address this problem.
Second, employers should be obliged automatically to 
integrate all employees in occupational pensions, in 
which they must also have a financial stake, while a 
minimum level should be set for the statutory pension. 
From a comparative standpoint it is unlikely that a pen-
sion system dependent on voluntary additional payments 
will be feasible without an expansion of dependency on 
income support in old age. The United Kingdom is an 
instructive example in this respect. Despite decades of 
trying, no British government has been able to encourage 
more extensive old-age provision at the voluntary level. 
The conclusion suggests itself that non-state actors – 
enterprises and insurance companies – will not voluntarily 
perform the task of helping to avoid old-age poverty. 
In the end, here too, the last country in the Beveridge 
group, companies are no longer left to their own devices 
in this respect and the statutory pension has been raised. 
Germany should follow this example, possibly – as in 
the United Kingdom – by giving employees the option 
of opting out of the occupational pension if they do not 
want it. Instead of tightening compulsory insurance even 
further, however, it is also, of course, possible to allow 
increasing dependency on income support among old 
people. The powers-that-be must in that case accept 
that part of the population will not claim such benefits 
and will thus be exposed to poverty. Furthermore, many 
people will not save for their sunset years if they know 
that in old age their accumulated capital will be set 
against income support. The latter consideration was 
one of the main reasons British politicians increased the 
state pension and introduced obligatory occupational 
pensions for all companies.
For a social democratic labour-market and social policy 
it will be easiest to pursue the goal of activation policy. 
Ideologically, this approach is currently the consensus 
throughout Europe, because at the very minimum it is 
deemed to be cost-neutral but it promises to reduce state 
expenditure over the long term. It would be much more 
controversial, however, to step up compulsory insurance 
for companies and to introduce a statutory minimum 
pension. After all, in 2001 Germany’s Social Democrat/
Green government brought about a paradigm change 
in the pension system not least to satisfy the demands 
of German industry for a reduction in non-wage labour 
costs. Raising them again would meet with strong 
resistance. Furthermore, in contrast to activation, no 
ideological support is to be expected from the European 
Union in this respect. Its White Book on pension reform, 25
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published in 2012 (European Commission 2012), does 
declare itself in favour of secure and fair pensions, but 
in order to achieve this goal the Commission advocates 
merely voluntary measures, to be encouraged by tax 
incentives and trade union participation. The evolution 
of public/private pension systems in Europe shows that 
such a policy cannot effectively reduce social risks and, 
furthermore, leads to considerable social inequalities. It 
would be a good thing if Social Democratic policymakers 
do not take their lead from the White Book but instead 
strike out on a more controversial path and help to en-
sure that the renunciation of the Bismarck model that is 
now under way is completed by a comprehensive change 
of direction towards the Beveridge model.26
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